Abstract: Despite the considerable research that has occurred over the twenty years following the publication of Ronald Gilson's and Reinier Kraakman's article, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, there still remains a fundamental puzzle concerning the price fluctuations of securities. The explanatory power -the R 2 -of various models used by financial economists to explain security price fluctuations is quite low, in the range of .20 to .30. What accounts for the other 70% to 80% of price fluctuations? This paper explores the challenges this puzzle poses to our understanding of security markets, the role played by mechanisms of market inefficiency (noise traders) as well as various mechanisms of market efficiency (information revelation via trading; the firm as arbitrageur) and the impact of legal institutions and practices on the operation of security markets. * I would like to thank Lucian Bebchuk and Guhan Subramanian for their helpful comments and the Harvard Law School John M. Olin Foundation for Law, Economics and Business for its financial support.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984 Ronald Gilson's and Reinier Kraakman's groundbreaking article, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, was published in the Virginia Law Review.
1 Their goal was to identify the market mechanisms by which information becomes impounded into security prices. Their article attempted to explain how security markets appeared to be -at least as a rough approximation -consistent with the efficient market paradigm with respect to a wide range of information. 2 The topic of market mechanisms is as important and pressing today as it has ever been.
Indeed, the identification of the market mechanisms that ensure market efficiency is part and parcel of one of the fundamental, unresolved questions of finance theory:
What accounts for fluctuations in security prices? Is it due to new information being constantly impounded into security prices as a result of one of the four "mechanisms of (1984) . 2 It is possible to have stock prices not reflect "fundamental values" and for EMH to still hold in the sense that one cannot earn supra-competitive profits based on the market information set. When referring to the efficient market paradigm, I am referring to the view that security prices equal the present value of future expected (optimally forecasted) dividends. 3 Throughout this piece, I shall sometimes refer to fluctuations in returns and sometimes to fluctuations in prices. The distinction between return and price fluctuations is immaterial for purposes of this commentary.
puzzle for all those interested in security markets; legal academics and financial economists alike.
Part II will discuss the fundamental puzzle posed by unexplained fluctuations. As will be emphasized, the inability to satisfactorily explain fluctuations has been documented in a number of important studies. Part III will then take a brief look at some potential answers suggested in the literature for why we see the fluctuations that have been documented. These include explanations based on the presence of noise traders, changes in investors' discount rates, and the operation of various mechanisms of market efficiency. Finally, in Part IV, I will explain why the puzzle surrounding fluctuations remains (and in some ways has deepened) to this day. Indeed, it is unclear, at this point,
whether an inability to explain the return and price fluctuations of a stock is a sign of market efficiency or inefficiency. Part IV will conclude with discussing the importance of this puzzle to legal academics interested in capital market regulation.
II. THE PUZZLE
At the time The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency was published, security price fluctuations were largely analyzed within the context of the efficient market paradigm.
And not without good reason. The impressive power of the efficient market paradigm can perhaps be seen most starkly in a now classic study published the same year as
Gilson and Kraakman's article: Richard Roll's empirical study of the futures market in frozen concentrated orange juice.
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A defining feature of this market is the fact that over 90 percent of all oranges used in frozen concentrated orange juice are grown in central Florida. As it turns out, central Florida oranges (given the thickness of their skins) make better frozen concentrated orange juice than California oranges, the other major source of oranges. As a result of the geographic concentration of oranges used for frozen concentrated orange juice, the weather in central Florida is of central importance to orange producers. An entire orange crop can be lost if the weather is too cold.
One would therefore expect that the anticipated weather in central Florida would be a primary factor in setting the price at which orange juice futures trade. And, indeed, this is true. Amazingly, the price of orange juice futures at the end of the trading day is a better predictor of the weather than the National Weather Service's forecast for central Florida, which is publicly released some seven hours after the orange juice futures market closes. The National Weather Service, keep in mind, is a well-regarded organization with considerable resources. If the closing orange juice future price is higher (lower) than its opening price, one would obtain a more accurate prediction of the weather by adjusting downward (upward) the National Weather Service's weather forecast.
While a powerful vindication of the efficient market paradigm, when looked at from this angle, the study also raises a troubling puzzle that remains to this day. Another study looked at the fifty largest daily changes in stock prices between 1946-1987. 7 It found that a majority of these dramatic price moves could not be rationalized as a response to new information triggering a reevaluation. It is difficult, for example, to explain the October 19, 1987 stock market crash as a reaction to dramatic new information reaching the market that particular day justifying a 22.6% drop in the value of Dow Jones Industrial Average.
The inability to satisfactorily explain price (or return) variation can be seen from yet another angle: the volatility of prices varies depending on whether markets are open.
One would expect the volatility of prices to be the same for equivalent lengths of time if new information is constantly being generated and disclosed. Yet, the volatility of prices is significantly lower when the time period includes the weekend rather than solely business days. 8 Nor is this just a "weekend effect." The volatility of the stock market during time periods that include a Wednesday on which the market was closed is significantly lower than time periods of equivalent length that include a Wednesday on which the market was open.
If our goal is to explain price behavior, it is fair to say that we appear to be 9 Many commentators believe that various pricing "anomalies", such as the book-to-market effect on stock returns, represent a challenge to the efficient market paradigm. It is difficult to know what to make of various reported pricing anomalies given the possibility that they are the result of fundamental risk that economists have yet to adequately identify or just an artifact of data snooping.
The Noise Trader Explanation
It should be observed from the outset that as a purely theoretical matter it must be the case that security prices are affected, at least somewhat, by "noise."
10 Otherwise, one runs into the well-known result that no one would ever rationally engage in securities trading. 11 The very willingness to engage in trade would reveal to any potential counterparty that one has superior information. As a result, a rational counter-party would never agree to trade. If there is a possibility that one of the parties is a "noise" trader then trade becomes possible. Having enough noise to grease the wheels of trade, however, is entirely different from a situation in which noise accounts for the bulk of volatility.
Many eminent financial economists, however, do believe that noise traders account for much of the unexplained volatility. 12 According to this view, price volatility is not driven solely by the mechanisms of market efficiency, but also "noise traders"
whose actions are correlated. 13 Correlated action ensures that "noise" will constitute a systematic, undiversifiable source of risk and, hence, be reflected in stock prices.
This approach has had some noted successes. Among the most successful applications of the noise trader approach is its explanation of the closed-end fund puzzle.
The puzzle lies in the fact that closed end funds -investment funds that have a fixed number of shares -often sell at a discount relative to the value of the shares the fund owns. The presence of "noise risk" would explain why such a discount exists in the first place. Moreover, the noise trader explanation predicts that the level and changes in
closed-end fund discounts should be correlated, regardless of the type of securities the fund holds, as noise traders' actions are correlated. And, indeed, this prediction is born out by the data.
14 Or some other mechanism that ensures that prices are not fully revealing of all information. Analytically, various ways of modeling this -such as assuming an uncertain supply of the risky asset. 11 This is the so-called No-Trade Theorem. 12 An excellent discussion of behavioral finance can be found in Shleifer's Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (2000). 13 The move from postulating "noise traders" to noisy prices, however, is a relatively short one. Even though these traders are often referred to as "liquidity traders" this is a bit of a misnomer. Individual investors' liquidity needs, say paying for grandmother's operation, are unlikely to explain why markets on a particular day experience substantial, unaccounted for price movements. A fuller explanation will require an understanding of the mechanisms of noise. What exactly are the coordination mechanisms that result in noise traders all doing the same thing at the same time? And, a question I will get back to in Part IV, how does the legal environment affect these coordination mechanisms?
And what of rational explanations for price fluctuations? Is it still possible to make the case that informed, rational traders, of one sort or another, are essentially driving price volatility?
The Variation in Discount Rates Explanation
One possibility for explaining price fluctuations, consistent with an efficient market perspective, is variation in discount rates. If discount rates fluctuate, then stock prices should also fluctuate given that stock prices are merely the discounted value of a future dividend stream. If the discount rate changes, then the value of the security should also change to reflect the market's new net present value calculation.
Overall, the empirical evidence, at least so far, does not appear to support this explanation. Much of the volatility in stock returns is not apparently attributable to changes in the discount rates.
15 This is, however, a still active area of research.
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Explanation
All this gets us back to the mechanisms of market efficiency. Is it possible to model the mechanisms of market efficiency in a way that accounts for the puzzling, 15 This finding is interesting because one would expect the less liquid, less-followed OTC market of the 1960s to be less informationally efficient than that of the listed market. Is the difference in R 2 s between the OTC market and the listed market evidence of this? Obviously, far more work needs to be done, especially in light of the fact that there is substantial body of work suggesting that low R 2 s are actually a sign of market efficiency.
A Low R 2 as a Sign of Market Efficiency
Recent empirical work on emerging stock markets has called into question whether low R 2 s are typically associated with market inefficiency. Randall Morck, along with his co-authors, has found that the degree to which stock prices in a country move in a synchronized manner is inversely related to that country's per capita gross GDP. 28 In their study, they used a market model of stock returns to estimate R 2 s.
in developed stock markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange. What makes this finding interesting is that this association between R 2 and emerging stock markets is not due to low-income countries having more correlated economic fundamentals. Something else appears to be driving the high R 2 s.
This association between economic development and stocks' R 2 s presents a challenge, on several levels, to those that wish to understand stock price fluctuations.
Stocks with low R 2 s are characteristic of highly developed stock markets. Given this association, when should low R 2 s of stocks be considered indicative of market inefficiency resulting from limited arbitrage? The normal assumption is that arbitrage, even if limited and imperfect, is likely to be more of a force for market efficiency in developed countries' stock markets; precisely those markets which tend to have low R 2 stocks.
Or consider Roll's finding that the low R 2 of U.S. stocks cannot be explained by public information reaching the market and triggering a reevaluation of stock prices. The
Morck findings suggest that there might be other mechanisms of market efficiency that are resulting in information being impounded into security prices that Roll was unable to adequately identify and control for by focusing on public information. One obvious "mechanism of market efficiency" candidate is market participants trading on propertiary, non-public information. The unexplained fluctuations in stock prices would then be the result of a rational reassessment of stocks' underlying fundamental value based on new non-public information. Such an explanation could account for Roll's finding that the R 2 of stocks is similar on days in which there is new information publicly revealed and days on which there appears to be no new information. It could also explain why volatility is lower on days on which there is no trading, if private information, as suggested by David Romer's model of price movements, is revealed through trading. 
Open Questions
Obviously a situation where low R A satisfactory answer to these questions will almost certainly involve consideration of the legal institutions and practices of countries (and markets) with different R 2 s. This will require the skills not only of the financial economist but the legal academic's understanding of legal institutions and practices.
A Promising Line of Inquiry: Legal Institutions and Practices
A suggestive first step is Morck, Yeung and Yu's finding that increased protection of private property rights in a country is correlated with lower average R 2 s for that country's stocks. 35 Assuming a low R 2 is a sign of market efficiency, how exactly does protection of private property assist the mechanisms of market efficiency? Or is the protection of private property just proxying for some other casually responsible element?
In thinking about these questions, it is important to note that differences in the protection of private property rights do not seem to explain the differences in average R 2 s of countries' stocks when only emerging countries (as opposed to also including developed countries) are included in Morck, Yeung and Yu's sample.
The mystery only deepens when one looks at the impact of the "anti-director rights index" which (supposedly) measures shareholders' rights against directors in various countries. 36 the "anti-director rights index" does not explain the level of development of stock markets (as measured by external stock market capitalization to GDP). 
V. CONCLUSION
The R 2 of stocks can be thought of as one of the "outputs" of the various mechanisms (whether rational or not) that drive price fluctuations. The fact that we do not understand the output of the mechanisms suggests that we do not understand the mechanisms themselves very well. Why are the R 2 s so low? Why do they vary over time? And why do they vary across countries and markets? These questions represent an exciting research agenda that will lead to a better understand of security pricing and the role legal institutions and practices play in that process. Much work remains to be done:
work that was begun some twenty years ago.
